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INTRODUCTION 
Why is it that successful people are often the most confident, with high levels of self-esteem and 
ambition?  Are elevated levels of self-esteem a function of a person's success?  Or is success itself at least 
partly a function of an individual's self-esteem, influenced by other factors such as parenting and family 
upbringing?  Our paper hypothesizes that signals communicated in the process of parenting influence the 
sense of worth and motivation of children later in their adult life.  We show that the origin of these signals lies 
in certain fundamental characteristics of both parents and children, and trace the process by which these 
characteristics influence behavior of altruistic parents toward their children, and how the resulting parental 
behaviors later affect the behavior of their children in college academics.  In short, children with a well-
developed sense of self-esteem may achieve more because they develop an incentive to try harder, believing 
that effort put into a task will ultimately reap a high payoff. 
Social psychology has long examined the role of motivation and confidence in the propensity to 
undertake or succeed in a given task (Deci, 1971; Condry and Chambers, 1978; Henderlong and Lepper, 
2002).  Recently, economics has introduced new tools to investigate the effects of incentives on performance 
(Kreps, 1997; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Kremer et al., 2004).  Our research adds to the growing body of 
literature bridging social psychology and economics by focusing on the relationship between self-esteem and 
achievement.  In this paper, we present a simple Parent-Child model that incorporates aspects of both 
principal-agent and signaling frameworks.  From our model we derive a mapping of outcomes for children 
based on child and parental types. We then test some of the implications of the model with first-hand data 
obtained from 651 university students. 
Our paper considers the relationship between self-esteem, effort, and achievement.  In the typical 
scenario, a principal--a manager, parent, teacher, or coach--has a vested interest in the amount of effort an 
agent--an employee, child, student, or player--exerts in an activity.  The principal can attempt to motivate 
performance by convincing the agent of a suitable return to effort, possibly through providing rewards or 
demonstrating confidence in the agent’s ability to succeed in the task.  Now consider an agent who is less 
informed about her true ability than the principal.  She will use the signals from the principal as a means of 
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learning about herself and the potential payoff of effort into the task.  Thus, the principal’s attempts to 
motivate the agent exert both direct and indirect influences: directly from the payoff provided for completing 
the task, and indirectly through the agent’s reflective inference of the signal sent by the principal’s actions 
toward her.  It has been argued in the literature that empowering and encouraging an agent can effectively 
send signals of confidence and raise self-esteem, which may raise achievement (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003).  
Conversely, “per contract” rewards or excessive forms of assistance may introduce extrinsic motivation that 
dominates an agent’s own intrinsic ambition (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al., 1973; Kreps, 1997).   
In the context of the parent-child relationship, opinions vary on what is most responsible for a child’s 
achievement.  The area has been a main theater for the well-known nature vs. nurture debate; some research 
finds that inherited skills are the most important factors, whereas other studies show environment to be a 
predominant influence.  Mueller and Dweck (1998) find through experimental methods that the type of praise 
a parent displays for a child matters.  Praise for intelligence tends to undermine academic initiative, while 
praise for effort encourages it.  There is evidence that parents with higher levels of education will have 
children who are better educated (Black et al., 2005; Oreopolous et al., forthcoming).  Still in question is 
whether naturally smart parents simply have naturally smart kids or if higher levels of intelligence and/or 
education better prepare parents to raise children who succeed academically.  While the question is important, 
our main focus is not to enter into this debate.  Instead, the paper assumes both nature and nurture play a 
role, taking differences in innate ability as given, and examining the influence parents and parenting can have 
on achievement levels of children.   
Our hypothesis posits that a parent can provide two broad types of contributions that will have 
divergent effects on child academic achievement.  The first type is complementary to the child’s own effort, will 
serve to foster the child’s skills, self-esteem, and motivation, and should therefore encourage overachievement 
relative to a child’s basic intelligence.  The second type is substitutionary to the child’s internal drive and 
undermines achievement relative to inherent ability.  One might ask why a parent would ever choose the 
second type of behavior, but the answer is simple.  An altruistic parent cares not just about the achievement 
of a child, but also about the welfare of the child.  For this reason our model conveys the idea that based on 
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the parent’s own attributes and a (pessimistic) view of a child's ability, an altruistic parent may choose to 
directly provide for a child rather than motivate her to achieve on her own.   
Our empirical work attempts to relate the costs and benefits of these contrasting behaviors to the 
economic endowment, psychological temperament, and child-rearing approach of the parent. Students were 
asked to describe the psychological temperament of their parents and examples of parenting behaviors in 
specific areas.  We use behaviors of the parent toward the student during childhood as independent variables 
along with a list of pre-existing family characteristics to examine their relationship to the components of 
achievement. We describe student achievement as measured by grade point average (GPA) as a function of 
inherent intelligence, which we estimate with a twenty-question intelligence quotient (IQ) test, student effort 
level, and academic skill (which we compute as a residual based on GPA minus IQ and effort).  
“Overachievers” are thus students who rank highly in GPA relative to IQ either because they exert more 
effort and/or have higher academic skill.   
The results from our estimations indicate that children who grow up with parents who praise them 
regularly exert a significantly greater effort in school work at the college level, such that on average they 
become overachievers relative to their natural IQ.  We also find that children whose parents read to them 
overachieve on average, not through increased effort, but through enhanced scholastic ability.  Furthermore, 
we find that while the dollar amount of a child's weekly or monthly allowance prior to college may exert 
neutral or negative effects on academic effort in college, children who were given an allowance only for the 
completion of a specific task display increased effort in college.  Children whose parents purchased them a car 
in high school display a lower effort level.  Moreover, controlling for parental behaviors, we find little 
significant relationship between parental income, education, or number of siblings and grade-point average, 
IQ, academic effort level, scholastic ability, or “overachiever” status. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I gives an overview of existing literature on the 
transmission of human capital, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and the determinants of educational 
achievement.  Section II describes our parent-child model, while Section III provides an overview of survey 
design and data.  Section IV presents and interprets estimated econometric results, and Section V concludes.  
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I. RELATED LITERATURE 
Our research draws from two primary existing veins of literature. The first examines the positive and 
negative effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  The second focuses on the demographic and 
environmental determinants of educational achievement. 
A. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) discuss the effects of rewards and empowerment on self-esteem and 
motivation. They study the connection between an individual’s motivation and her social environment in a 
variety of relationships, including manager and employee, teacher and student, and parent and child. 
Illustrated in a principal-agent model, the agent may be uncertain of the payoff to a particular action proposed 
by the principal, and therefore will undertake the action or provide a high level of effort only if she is 
sufficiently confident of success in the task. The principal’s goal is to therefore increase the agent’s self-
confidence in the assignment.  Since there are unknowns to each party (for example, the agent’s raw ability 
may be known better by the agent, the difficulty of the project known better by the principal) the agent will 
look for overt and private signals in order to ascertain the attractiveness of the task.  In almost all 
environments, the agent relies on the “looking glass self” (Cooley, 1902) to infer private information from 
signals of the principal, and therefore garner information about herself.  This framework may be especially 
salient in the parent-child relationship, as the child may believe the parent knows more about her than herself, 
and so will weigh signals from her parent heavily in updating her type.  
There has been substantial literature (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al., 1973) claiming that rewards for tasks 
are weak or even negative compellers to action.  Assistance and high extrinsic motivation offered by a 
principal may serve to lower an agent’s self-esteem, decrease intrinsic motivation, and create dependence.  
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) demonstrate that under asymmetric information intrinsic motivation may decrease 
with the level of an extrinsic bonus if the agent is unsure of her ability.  Conversely, they show that lower 
incentives may actually signal greater trust in the agent, increasing self-esteem and intrinsic motivation. 
Extrinsic incentives may be effective in a workplace setting, where relationships are relatively short and 
immediate results often outweigh any long-term effect.  However, in our context, a parent is not only 
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concerned with the temporary outcome of tasks for their child, but also more likely valuing sustained effort 
and long-term success.   
Henderlong and Lepper (2002) argue that praise may be a compelling motivator in many instances, 
such that, “Provided that praise is perceived to be sincere, it is particularly beneficial to motivation when it 
encourages performance attributions to controllable causes, promotes autonomy, enhances competence 
without an overreliance on social comparisons, and conveys attainable standards and expectations.”   
Extrinsic incentives, however, may also matter, even in academic settings.  Kremer, et al. (2004) find 
that girls in Kenya experienced significant increases in tests scores when they were eligible for a merit 
scholarship program. Not only did scores increase immediately, but the gains remained in the year after the 
competition. Moreover, the students’ attitudes towards school or their own abilities appeared unaffected. This 
positive longer-term result contrasts with the previously discussed models emphasizing negative extrinsic 
motivation.  Thus the literature seems to indicate that both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives can have 
ambiguous effects, and it is not fully understood in which contexts the positive and negative effects dominate.  
B. Determinants of Educational Achievement 
A number of studies in psychology and sociology have associated parental support for academic 
progress at home, particularly in reading, with academic achievement in school.  In a controlled experiment, 
Lembert (1985) finds mothers’ time with a child reading, teaching a child colors, and telling her stories is 
significantly associated with a child’s reading performance in school.  She also finds a positive association 
between the mothers’ expectations of educational achievement and actual achievement. 
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) provide an extensive review on the existing literature on determinants of 
schooling attainment and achievement, finding large and statistically significant effects across studies of 
parental time into a child’s educational process, such as parental school involvement, reading materials in the 
home, and adherence to religion. Moreover, the authors find that the magnitude of the effects of direct 
parental input into education dominate the much smaller effects of incentives created by both markets and 
governments for increased investment in schooling by children. 
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Fryer and Levitt (2004, 2006) find that racial gaps in academic achievement could be due to parental or 
environmental influences, difficult summer situations, or that the standards of measurement (often 
standardized testing) do not accurately assess the skills of minorities. The authors find that socio-economic 
status and the number of children's books in the home are positive factors associated with both higher reading 
and math test scores.  But their empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis that school quality has a 
strong influence in achievement and that determinants of divergence between children cannot be purely 
attributed to background and parenting.  
II. THE MODEL 
Consider a game between two players who we will refer to as the Child and the Parent.1  The game 
shares some characteristics with a standard principal-agent framework.  The Parent (principal) has certain 
parameters under her control that influence the effort level of a Child (agent), the effort level affecting an 
outcome that matters to the Parent.  However, the model differs from the standard principal-agent framework 
in that the Parent is altruistic; he cares about the utility of the Child, and in fact incorporates the Child's utility 
function into his own.   
 The model also incorporates some facets of a standard signaling game.  However, it differs in that in 
the typical signaling game, the sender has knowledge of his or her own type that is hidden to the receiver, and 
therefore sends a signal to the receiver in order to communicate his type.  In contrast, our model considers 
the opposite case. The Child (receiver) is unsure of her own type, but the Parent (sender) knows the Child’s 
type, as well as his own.  Of central importance is this asymmetric information gap between the two parties, in 
which messages from the Parent can override the Child’s view of herself.  These messages from the Parent 
may be calculated or unintentional, but are communicated with the Child's interest in mind.  Because the 
altruistic nature of the Parent is common knowledge, the Child views the Parent’s messages as a superior 
judgment of her (the Child's) true type.   Since the Child has an evolving self-concept of her own aptitude, she 
may supersede her own prior self-view with her interpretation of the Parent’s view, which then contributes to 
her self-esteem.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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}
The timing of the game is as follows and is shown in Figure 1.  Nature chooses a natural ability, or 
type, for the Child, { HLi θθθ ,∈  for a given activity such as schooling, athletics, artistic, or musical talent, 
where θL represents low ability and θH represents high ability with probabilities  and Lp LH pp −≡ 1 , 
respectively. 2  The parameter θi  is an input for an activity that is complementary to effort in producing 
success, probably best described as “giftedness.”     
The Parent, with a vested interest in the utility of the Child, decides how to respond to the Child's 
type, either through offering “encouragement,” n, “assistance,” s, neither, or both, such that n ∈{ n , n } and 
s ∈ { s , s }.   In this way, the Parent chooses a low or high amount of resources to devote to encouragement 
or assistance to the Child.  “Encouragement” is intended to represent actions by the Parent that affirm the 
Child’s ability and effort in a given activity, such as school, music, or athletics.  Encouragement involves 
investing the necessary amount of time and effort to help convince the Child of her own capability in 
undertaking the given activity.   
In some cases, the Parent may have an interest in affirming the Child’s capability in (for example) 
school, when the Child is not truly a gifted type.  All else equal, however, the Parent has a greater incentive to 
encourage the truly gifted Child, since giftedness and effort are complementary, making increased effort by the 
gifted Child pay larger dividends than increased effort for a less-gifted Child.   Thus, greater encouragement 
builds the Child's self-esteem, making her believe that any level of effort will display a greater marginal return 
than otherwise.   
“Assistance,” unlike encouragement, is a substitute for a child’s own effort.  It can take various forms 
depending on the activity.  For younger children in elementary school, it may take the form of leading a child 
to answers on a homework problem, or directly helping the child carry out much of the difficult work on a 
project.  It may involve offering a higher allowance if the child seems unable to earn money on his own by 
working for others, or giving an allowance without expectation for household chores in return.   Assistance 
may also take the form of various interventions, but its defining characteristic is to make sure that "everything 
turns out O.K.” for a child.   
The following examples help clarify the difference in parenting approaches we describe.  An 
"encouraging" parent tells a child that her natural brilliance means that effort devoted to schoolwork will yield 
good grades.  An "assisting" parent solves many homework problems for the child.  An "encouraging" parent 
exhorts her child to obtain a part-time job so that she can save to buy a car.  An “assisting” parent buys the 
car for the child to make sure she has adequate transportation.  For older children in their later teens and 
twenties, assistance may specifically take the form of direct financial transfers, perhaps resulting from a fear 
that the child will be unable to achieve financial independence as a result of her own performance in college 
or post-high school training.   
In some cases actions taken by the parent may be difficult to categorize.  For example, is the hiring of 
a math tutor or a music teacher encouragement or assistance?  But the general distinction is that one type of 
action encourages effort while the other substitutes for a desired outcome.  We will see that both encouragement 
and assistance can be rational actions by an altruistic parent, but that they also indirectly affect a child’s self-
esteem (belief about her own type).  Encouragement adds to the child’s self-esteem, while assistance subtracts 
from it.  
The Parent’s type is given in the model by costs of providing n and/or s  for the Child, ( ]νν ~,0∈j  
and ( ]σσ ~,0∈j  respectively, independently distributed across the population of Parents.  The Parent’s type is 
thus defined by jjj θσν →× .  The Parent has perfect knowledge of his own type, but the Parent’s type is 
hidden information to the Child.    
We posit that heterogeneity in jθ  across Parental types may be influenced by two broad categories of 
characteristics: psychological and economic.  Consider first differing psychological attributes of the Parent.  It may be 
that jν  is related to a Parent’s own self-esteem, i.e. it is more difficult for a Parent with low self-esteem to 
encourage a Child, or involve higher psychic costs, as in Spence (1974).   A Parent with higher self-esteem 
(low jν ) may simply have greater emotional resources at his disposal for encouragement.  Additionally, it 
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in parti
nsion of 
 
T) 
(SP) and Epimethean (SJ) temperaments find it easier to 
render 
 
t 
 economic attributes of the Parent may also 
influenc
could be that power or patronage plays into the relationship such that it may make a low-type 
Parent feel better to make a Child who is a high type believe that she is also a low type, a kind o
“Stepmother/Cinderella” phenomenon.   
Our paper also incorporates the po
cular the difference between the Jungian perception functions, Sensation (S) and Intuition (N) 
(Jung, 1920).  The perception functions are considered dominant, described as the “fundamental dime
human difference,” while the judging functions (Thinking, T and Feeling, F) and the attitudes (Judgment, J 
and Perception, P) are considered auxiliary (Keirsey and Bates, 1984).  Using these functions to separate the
four temperaments as discussed in Keirsey and Bates (1984) we explore how differences between the 
preferences of sensitive (Dionysian, SP/Epimethean, SJ) and intuitive (Apollonian, NF/Promethean, N
types will shape parental responses to their children. 
In Jung’s framework, the sensitive Dionysian 
assistance through their focus on "today."   The Dionysian temperament is focused on immediate 
action and performance, rather than preparation for tomorrow.  In contrast, both the intuitive Promethean
(NT) and Apollonian (NF) types share goals of attaining higher knowledge and a broad range of abilities, 
rather than immediate performance. “As with the NT, the NF is future-oriented and focused on what migh
be” (Keirsey and Bates, 1984). The Apollonian type is naturally more apt to cultivate potential in others and 
actualize the abilities of those around them.  The Promethean type possesses a love of intelligence and 
attainment of abilities, often vital to long-term achievement.  
While these represent important psychological attributes,
e jθ .  The building of self-esteem in the Child is a significant function of a Parent’s time devote
the nurturing and affirmation of the Child (Gecas and Swchalbe, 1986), and for this time-investment by the 
Parent there is often little substitute.  But as a Parent's wage increases, the opportunity cost of spending time
with children increases, while the time opportunity cost of providing assistance to the Child decreases.  
A Parent with a lucrative profession may therefore find the opportunity cost of esteem-building 
d to 
 
encouragement of the Child higher than a Parent with a more modest income.  
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 direct assistance when an 
agent k
 
As Bénabou and Tirole (2003) point out, there do exist cases in which direct help from a 
be indicative of high ability, such as if an agent's higher type is complementary to
nows the principal’s own payoff is increasing in the level of help.  Being aware of such cases, however, 
we will focus on the first and perhaps more common case, in which the provision of direct aid to the Child
communicates to her that the outcome from her own effort may be insufficiently low.   
The Parent chooses n ∈ { n , n } and s ∈ { s , s } in order to maximize his own payoff, Up, which is 
function of the utility of the Child less the costs of encouragement and assistance, where
a 
 if nn = 1 =nd  and 
 if 1=sd ss = , and both variables are equal to zer  otherwise. 
 (1)    
o
sjnjcp ddvUU σ−−=      
hild lity is a function of the net rewards accruing fromThe C ’s uti  his or her own effort, less the cost of this 
ffort is normalized to o received effort (where the marginal disutility of e ne), and from the assistance (transfer) 
from the Parent.   
(2)    ( ) seelnU ic +−⋅= θ       
 Based on the actions of the Parent, the Child updates her belief regarding her type, or her self-esteem.  
Let { }[ ] θθE ˆ, =sn , where { }snsn θθθθ ,,ˆ∈ en chooses an effort level snsn θ, .  The Child th snsn ee ,  snsn eee ,,*∈
that maximizes [ ] ( ) seelnUE ˆ , and c +−⋅= θ ss = if assistance is rendered and zero if ss = .  For simplicity, we 
assume the effects of encouragement and assistance on Child self-esteem are independent, i.e. 
0ˆˆˆ >=− snsn θθθ } and 0ˆˆ <−sn θθ  for s ∈ {
n
 for n ∈{ n , n ˆ =
s
snθ s , s }.   Figure 1 p es a schematic of
the game.    
correspond to er belief about her type, θˆ .  The 
Child will choose 
rovid  
 First, note that the optimal effort of the Child will  h
e to maximize 
i
[ ] ( ) seelnθUE c +−⋅=  ˆ , which yields the first-order condition 
[ ]
01
ˆ =−=
ede
UdE C θ , or that .  Defining θˆ* =e nsnsn eee ≡−  for n ∈{ n , n  for s ∈{ s , s} and ssnsn eee ≡− }, 
and using this result we obtain the following: 
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LEMMA 1:  A high-ability Child, θH, is more likely to receive encouragement by a Parent than a 
L
PROOF
low-ability Child, θ .   
: By equations (1) and (2), the Parent will encourage the Child if ( ) nsnsnij elnln −−< θθθν ˆˆ , which given 
( ]νν ~,0∈j , is more likely to hold for θH than θL.   
 
LEMMA 2: A lower ability Child, θL, is more likely to be provided assistance by a Parent than a 
high-ability Child, θH.   
PROOF: By equations (1) and (2), the Parent will assist the Child if ( ) selnln ssnsnij +−−< θθθσ ˆˆ , 
( ) 0ˆˆ <− snsn lnln θθwhich given ( ]σσ ~,0∈  and noting that j , is more likely to hold for θL than θH.   
 
By using LEMMAS 1 and 2 and a straightforward application of Bayes Rule, it can be shown that 
( ) ( )npnp HH θθ >
easily shown that,
, or that the Child, who does not know her own type or the Parent’s type, knows she has a 
higher probability of being a high type if she has received encouragement from the Parent.  Similarly, it is 
( ) ( )spsp HH θθ <  or that the Child knows she has a lower probability of being a high type 
given that she has received assistance from the Parent.  The following proposition follows from these results: 
PROPOSITION: For each pair of types θi  and θj, there exists a single perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium that 
yields an optimal pair of actions for the Parent {n*, s*} and an optimal level of effort, e* for the Child. 
ROOFP : Let the set of ordered pairs of Child’s and Parent’s types θi ×  θ  be given by 3ℜ⊂T , and let the set j
of ordered pairs of Parent actions n ×  s  be given by .  Further, let  f: T , represent the 
mapping of the Child and Parent types into the pair of actions by the Parent, and  represent the 
mapping of the actions of the Parent into the beliefs of the Child about his type, where .  Since f 
and g are both functions, then the product function
2ℜ⊂A → A
g: A → θˆ
1ˆ ℜ∈θ
 gfh o≡  is also a function.  Thus, θˆ: →Th  
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types, θi
The  t in 
Figu
represents a function that yields a unique level of self-esteem θˆ  for the Child for every ordered pair of 
types in T.  Since by LEMMA 1, θˆ* =e , there exists a single perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium set of 
actions {n*, s*} and e* for each pair of Child-Parent nd θ   a j.   
 results of LEMMAS 1 and 2 and the PROPOSITION can be used o create the behavioral mappings found 
res 2A and 2B, which yield self-  and achievement behavior of Children as a function of T = θesteem i ×  θj.  
The  1 and 2.  Eight different resulting 
 
little encouragement but much assistance from parents; (2) Independent High Achievers, who receive little 
encouragement or assistance; (3) Dependent High Achievers, to whom parents provide ample amounts of both 
encouragement and assistance; and (4) Highest Achievers, gifted types who receive ample encouragement but 
little assistance from parents.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2A HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2B HERE] 
 Among the less-gifted also merges four classes of behaviors: (1) Material Dependents, less-gifted types who 
receive large amount assistance, but little encouragement from parents; (2) Independent Low Achievers, receiving 
little encouragement or assistance; (3) Material and Emotional Dependents, to whom parents provide large amounts 
of encouragement and assistance; and (4) Emotionally Dependent Overachievers, those who perform a level that 
surpasses their natural giftedness as a result of strong encouragement (but little assistance) from parents.  
 
of 
2005 and the spring semester of 2006.  Table 1 displays summary statistics from the sample.  Students 
reported ages of 17 to 48 with an average age of 21.37.  The sample included 92 graduate students from 
classes in economics, business, and education and 559 undergraduate students from economics, psychology, 
 cutoff points in the maps, ν1, ν2, σ1 and σ2, are obtained from LEMMAS
Child behaviors are derived in the mapping.  
  The classes of behaviors among highly gifted children include (1) Gifted Underachievers who receive
III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We test some of the implications from our model using a survey administered to 651 undergraduate
and graduate students conducted in classrooms at the University of San Francisco during the fall semester 
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history,
ing a 
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as 
 
t there is likely to be some amount of homogeneity of the data, given all subjects 
were stu
he 
pe 
, 
ey.  The students were asked 
self-reported level of effort in university coursework, 
as well  
 business, language, science, and education.  Students reflected the wide ethnic diversity of the 
university: 52% were European or Anglo Americans, 33% were Asian or Asian American, 10% were Latino, 
and 5% were African or African American.  We sought a random sample of targeted students by survey
variety of complete classes.   
While surveys were voluntary in compliance with the protection of human subjects, in the majority of
classes, all students in attendance for a particular course participated in the study.  In courses where som
students declined to participate, statistics were compared against total population for possible bias, but none w
found.  Students who are missing data on undergraduate GPA or did not take the IQ test were dropped from
the sample.  We recognize tha
dents at the same university.  However, the ethnic diversity of the university mitigates this problem, 
allowing for more variation in the sample than might exist elsewhere.  US News & World Report ranks it in t
top 25 most ethnically diverse national universities, where the university is classified as “selective,” with an 
average undergraduate SAT score of 1150.  We also recognize the qualms some researchers maintain over the 
use of IQ tests as a measure of raw intelligence, despite their widespread use in academic research.  However, 
given the lack of alternatives, the fundamental nature of many of the questions (many of which dealt with sha
and pattern recognition), and the broad distribution of outcomes on our 20-question test (μ = 9.85, σ2 = 7.84)
we feel that the test was able to capture important variations in raw intelligence. 
Survey Design 
The subjects were asked to fill out a two-part survey, which took approximately twenty minutes.  
Students were first given ten minutes to complete a twenty-question test, based on aptitude problems used to 
measure IQ, including verbal, abstract reasoning, quantitative, and visual-spatial questions.3  After the IQ test, 
students were given an indefinite amount of time to complete a 48-question surv
questions about their current grade point average, their 
as their parents’ personality characteristics, approaches to parenting, different types of actions their
parents took related to academic activities, if and under what conditions they received rewards or allowance, 
whether their parents had purchased them a car, income and educational data about their parents, and other 
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est.”  Students more often received rewards for success (33.7%), rather than 
effort (20
ter 
e context of our theory (we used a composite score including other parental 
tempera
nt as 
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
To examine causes of achievement, we disaggregated different components of academic success.  
Achievement in school (as measured by GPA) is a function of intelligence (IQ), academic effort, and 
“academic skill,” best described as “how good one is at school.”  We assume a GPA production function such 
that GPA = F(IQ, Academic Effort , Academic Skill).  Each observation is given a percentile score that 
corresponds to the rank respective to that category. GPA Percentile is the percentile rank for the student’s 
similar questions.  The survey incorporated controls for parental education and income since they have been 
found to be significantly associated with educational achievement in past literature (see review by Haveman 
and Wolfe, 1995).  Other variables used as controls include age, race, undergraduate or graduate student 
status, and number of siblings.   
We included questions in the survey about students’ perception of their own intelligence and their 
perceptions of their parents’ perception of their intelligence, finding that students considered themselves a 
little more intelligent than their peers, but not as intelligent as they believed their parents think them to be.4  
About 59.1% of students responded that “I try hard in school, but not as hard as I could,” whereas only 
25.5% said “I try hard to do my b
.8%), on academics.   
We included three parental personality questions to reflect parents’ psychological temperaments  Af
reviewing the responses, we felt that the question “Which best describes your father (mother)?  A) Accepted 
you who you are; or B) Pushed you to reach your potential” best summarized the distinction between a 
strongly intuitive parent (Apollonian/Promethean) in contrast to the sensitive parent 
(Dionysian/Epimethean) in th
ment questions in some of our estimations which yielded very similar results).   In our estimations we 
also included dummy variables to indicate whether a parent had ever helped the student cheat on an 
assignment, had ever completed the majority of a school assignment for the child, and whether the stude
a child had received allowance without having to complete some task or chore.   
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tance” (such as higher allowances, helping children to cheat on tests, 
 at the time of survey.5  IQ Percentile is the percentile r
roblem-solving test.  Academic Effort measures the student’s reported level of effort to do college 
academic work well.  We calculate Academic Skill, the relatively intangible proficiency in study skills and
productivity of academic work, as a residual from a regression of GPA on IQ and Academic Effort.6  We also 
convert this residual into a percentile rank.  Of course, students will also perform better when they h
selected a major in which they are able to excel, so academic skill as a residual also includes this and other 
factors that are associated with higher college achievement as measured by GPA, and must be interpreted as 
such.  Our measure of “overachiever” status is Overachiever = GPA − IQ  by the intermediate factors that 
foster overachievement: academic skill and effort.  Overachiever thus gives a measure of how well a studen
performing academically relative to innate intelligence level as measured by our IQ test.  We are aware that th
use of percentile rankings may "flatten" the distribution of a variable, but feel that the benefits in establish
comparability among our dependent variables of interest outweigh this disadvantage for our purposes.  
Moreover, we understand that each of these measures is imperfect, but at the same time capture fundamental
phenomena that we seek to measure.   
 There are two main sets of implications from our model that we seek to test.  The first is that parental
actions toward the child are related to the innate attributes of the parent and the child.  The second is how the 
academic behavior and achievement of college students is related to these parenting behaviors. In other 
words, does parental investment of time, energy, and encouragement toward children produce students 
are “overachievers” who excel in college relative to their innate IQ?  Conversely, we seek to ascertain the 
extent to which forms of parental “assis
giving cars as gifts to children, etc.) produce children who become dependent “underachievers.”  Moreover, 
we would like to find out if parental time investments in children that produce overachieving children, such as 
reading to them, being involved with their schooling, or praising them for their accomplishments, operate 
through increased effort level or improved scholastic ability. 
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ε+2       
here yi is a dependent variable related to academic achievement, X1 is a vector of parenting characteristics, X2 
 a vector of innate family and personal characteristics, β1 and β2 are parameter vectors, and εi is an error 
X1 are related to some of those in X2 (and even influenced by them 
 
s in (3) and X1 or X2.  We are aware of the potential for 
omitted pted to include a large num
g 
gh 
n 
 characteristics such as allowance level (negative), taking children to cultural events 
(positiv ave a 
 
A. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation 
 We will examine these empirical relationships using several approaches.  First is through the reduced-
form OLS estimation of the recursive equation  
(3)    iiy α ++= '2 βXβX 1'1 i
w
is
term.  Although some of the variables in 
as put forward by our theory), OLS estimation of the recursive equation will be unbiased and consistent given
the absence of correlation between the error term
 variable bias, and thus we attem ber of controls in both our survey and 
estimation, including parental behaviors, household background characteristics, age of student, number of 
siblings, and ethnicity.   
Table 2 presents these results.7  We first examine student achievement (as measured by GPA 
percentile rank) with and without controls for IQ and effort.  As we would be expect, GPA is strongly and 
positively associated with both IQ and effort, both significant at the 99% confidence level.  Not controllin
for other variables, there is a mildly negative correlation (ρ = -0.069) between student effort and IQ, althou
both strongly and positively affect GPA.  In our estimations on IQ, we find interesting associations betwee
student IQ and parenting
e), and rewards for academic effort (negative).  Fathers are more involved with children who h
higher IQ, while mothers are more involved with children who have a lower IQ.  Clearly we do not contend
that these factors cause differences in IQ, but rather we view these estimations as conditional correlations.   
Students who report that their parents praised them frequently when they were young (not just for 
academics), appear to exert a higher level of effort in college.  This is consistent with Bénabou and Tirole 
(2000), who argue that if a principal can demonstrate confidence in the agent’s ability, the agent will be more 
likely to exert effort in a given task.  In this way a parent who regularly affirms his belief in a child will build 
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ter 
 5.   
ionship with GPA, through their negative association with a student’s IQ rank 
(we use ause of 
n with IQ 
the child’s self-esteem and motivation.  One would think the result may be subject to some simultaneity, in 
that a parent may praise the child more if they achieve more.  However, we find parental praise to be almost
y orthogonal to IQ.  Moreover, the question captures general praise, not merely for academics, and 
specifically asks for praise before college.  The increased effort in college leads to a point estimate on 
overachieving that would suggest a 4.2 percentage point increase in effort, and is significant at a 99% level of 
confidence.   
 It is important to scrutinize such results for the possibility that they are driven by correlated 
unobservables.  For example, suppose that some children, for whatever reason, consistently exert more effort
than others and are then praised more by parents.  While it is of course impossible to rule this out, we have 
both theoretical and empirical reasons to view it as unlikely.  First, this possibility assumes that the chi
consistently exerts a sub-optimal level of effort for reasons unrelated to feedback from the parent, that is, 
chooses a leve
Moreover, it would also assume that the parent is either not fully rational or not fully altruistic, becau
parent under this scenario lavishes encouragement or assistance based on the child's effort rather than her 
welfare.  Second, in our empirical explanation in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, the inclusion of effort in colum
1 has a negligible affect on the encouragement and assistance variables--they are virtually identical in both
estimations.  Thus the encouragement/assistance variables are important to academic performance even af
controlling for child effort. 
These estimations also show that the frequency with which the parents read to their child has a 
positive, significant effect on GPA.  But as Table 2 shows, reading to children appears to produce 
overachieving children not because it increases their effort (perhaps through higher self-esteem, according to 
our theory) as shown in Column 4, but because it augments their level of academic skill, as seen in Column
Some variables such as higher levels of childhood allowance received and rewards given for academic 
effort display a negative relat
 primary school allowance in the estimations and do not include secondary school allowance bec
multicollinearity between the two variables; secondary school allowance shares a negative associatio
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oals.  The 66 Latino students and 35 African and African 
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and positive association to father’s income).  Of course such actions are unlikely to reduce a child’s IQ, but th
are consistent with the predictions of our model in that they are the kind of “assisting” actions a parent may 
en lacking confidence in a child’s own innate ability and motivation.  However, as seen in Column 4, 
giving an allowance to a child in exchange for chores is associated with higher college academic effort (significa
at an 88% level of confidence).   
Our results provide other fuel for stereotypes about “spoiled kids.”  For example, on average, having 
received a car gift is negatively associated with lower college academic effort, and lower academic skill.  This 
contributes to underachieving students.  We find no statistical difference in IQ for children who received cars
as gifts as compared to those who didn’t, and since Overachiever percentile = GPA percentile – IQ percentile, the 
decreased effort causes these children to underachieve relative to their natural intelligence.  Though the 
coefficients are statistically insigni
ent before college exert less effort in college. 
Psychological theory contends that an Apollonian/Promethean (intuitive) parent should be more likel
to try to push the student to her potential, while a Dionysian/Epimethean (sensitive) parent should more 
likely accept the child for who she is.  In contradiction to this theory, the results in Table 2 indicate parents
whose attitudes are better described as “accepted who you are” seem to provoke a higher GPA rather th
parents who “pushed you to reach your potential.”   
The results in Table 2 point to other relationsh
cy of being taken to cultural events is associated with a higher student IQ (perhaps from a higher 
parental IQ), but is also associated with a lower college academic effort, thus also being heavily associated 
underachievement.  The older the student, the higher level of effort, but the lower the level of academic skill
possibly because older college students may be farther removed from skills learned in high school, but 
simultaneously more committed to their educational g
an students in the study score lower on the IQ test, but not significantly lower in GPA, rendering t
overachievers on average by our measure.  A similar phenomenon is found among those from families wit
high number of siblings.  Lastly, and perhaps most surprisingly, we find no statistically significant association for
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the direct effect of mother or father’s education or income once we include parenting behaviors.  The results w
present are robust to alternative specifications, the inclusion of polynomials, and changes in functional f
Many of the results of the reduced-form estimations appear more clearly in our OLS specification in 
Table 3, which estimates the components of student academic achievement solely on our significant parenting 
behaviors, removing the personal characteristics and parental characteristics (which are all independently 
insignificant) and insignificant parental behaviors.  In this estimation effort and IQ are strongly related to 
student achievement.  And though in the reduced-form estimation we remain wary of attributing causality, we 
clearly see the association of reading with enhanced academic skill and thus overachievement, parental praise 
ssociated with increased academic effort, high allowances with low GPAs, and car gift and cultural 
events with lower college effort. 
B. Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation 
 While the relationships we uncover in Table 2 yield unbiased estimates of family characteristics and
parenting behaviors on the components of academic achievement, the very nature of their reduced form limits 
causal inference.  We also seek to estimate our model more directly.  Specifically, we posit that there exists a 
direct functional relationship f  between the ordered pair of types θi ×θj ≡T and the ordered pairs of Parent
actions n ×  s  ≡ A, i.e.  f: T → A. 
 
 These actions from the parent th create a belief by the Child about her 
spondence between the Child's own action 
.  This set of structural relationships can be taken to the data. 
 Our strategy uses the set of pre-existing innate family and personal characteristics as first-stage 
exogenous instruments that determine parental behavior toward the child.  Our second stage utilizes the 
estimated outcomes for parental behavior in turn as explanatory variables for child (student) academic 
1
en 
type, i.e. g: A → θˆ , where there is then a one-to-one corre
θˆ   * ande
behaviors and outcomes so that we estimate  
    (4a)    x i1j ε+′= λX       
arental behavior j, where λ is a parameter vector of innate cha
2
for each p racteristics, and 
 (4b)    iiy 2
~ˆ ε+′+′= ψXγX 21                 
for each child response i  as a function of the vector of instrumented parental behaviors 1Xˆ  and other 
exogenous characteristics in ~ , and where γ and ψ  are also parameter vectors.   2X , 2X
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 There are two concerns with this kind of IV estimation.  The first issue relates to the strength of our 
instruments.  Because in (4b) we are estimating a model with multiple endogenous right-hand side variables, a 
rtial F-statistics of joint significance of the excluded instruments in each mo
 for joint significance 
th for three of the four endogenous right-
8
endogenous variables in our model, we calculate Cragg-Donald statistics to test for weak identification with 
multiple endogenous regressors and Shea's partial R2 measures that test for intercorrelations among the 
instruments.  If only a few of the instruments are doing all of the heavy lifting in each of the first-stage 
estimations, then functionally the estimation may be under-identified.  Results of these joint tests of our 
instruments indicate weak-instrument problems in the IV models, even though many of our first-stage tests 
show statistical significance with multiple instruments.  We attempt to ameliorate the problem through the use 
of limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimators that are more robust to weak instruments 
(Chao and Swanson, 2005; Hausman et al., 2005).  The LIML point estimates and statistical significance are 
directionally similar to the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, but tests for multiple endogenous variables 
continue to indicate some of our instruments may not be pulling their own weight in the first stage.   
 Despite some evidence of joint-instrument weakness in our 2SLS estimations, we believe these 
estimations are important because they represent the most direct estimation of our model.  Furthermore, 
despite potential instrument weakness, we continue to find significant results in 2SLS estimations that 
corroborate some of our most basic OLS results.  For this reason, we include the estimations with 
appropriate caveats.    
 The second potential issue with our IV estimates is that family and parental characteristics could 
display a direct effect on child behavior independent from their indirect association through parenting 
test of the pa del represents the 
first hurdle for testing instrument strength.  As seen at the bottom of Table 4, the F-tests
of the excluded instruments indicate sufficient instrument streng
hand-side variables that we include in the second stage estimation.   However, because we have multiple 
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behavior and thus fail to satisfy the exclusion restriction requirement, necessary for an instrument to be 
(for example, research has shown a strong correlation between parental education and child achievement).
Consistent with our model, however, we posit that the "effects" of these pre-existing characteristics, su
parental education, are manifest via identifiable parenting behaviors; once the behavior is accounted
pre-existing characteris
To address this second issue, we carry out Sargan exclusion restriction tests for each of our 
instruments (mother’s and father’s education and income, number of siblings, and Black, Latino, and A
ethnicity).  We carried out tests for each of our four dependent variables and all eight of our instruments.  We 
find that in all of these 32 separate tests, none of these instruments adds significant explanatory power to th
regression (even at an 80% level of confidence) when they are subtracted from the list of instruments and 
added to the second stage estimations in (4b). In other words, at least within the scope of our data, exogenou
family characteristics appear to affect children through par
e, the fact that a parent may be Asian affects a child through an identifiable behavior that is c
with being Asian, but there is no direct effect on the child's behavior by simply coming from an Asian family
That these instruments are determined prior to the parenting behaviors moreover gives us a theoretical basis 
for their exogeneity.  However, though it is widely used, the Sargan test assumes the validity of a subset of 
instruments in the testing of a given instrument.  And for this reason, it does not necessarily present a suref
test for the exclusion restriction.  With these caveats to our instrumental variables estimations, we proceed. 
 We report estimations nearly identical to our instrumental first-stage estimations of (4a) in Table 4; 
however, in Table 4 we also include IQ rank as an additional explanatory variable.  From these linear 
estimations of the function f, it is clear that parental behavior is responsive to both child type as well as parenta
characteristics, justifying their use as instruments.  Whether a student was praised frequently, taken to cultural
events, and read to frequently as a child are all positively related to mother’s and father's education, but negativ
related to the number of siblings in the student's family as well as to Asian family background, with nearly all of
these relationships significant at the 99% level of confidence.  Students from Latino families are also less like
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major components of academic achievement.  A 10-percentile-point increase in IQ rank is associated with an 
to have had parents that read to them, but are not less likely to be praised.  Frequency of parental criticism i
negatively related to student IQ, father's income, and positively related to Asian family background. 
Parental characteristics also influence pecuniary transfers to children.  The amount of allowance a 
student was given and the likelihood receiving a car as a gift from parents are both (not surprisingly) 
increasing functions of father's income.  That a child's allowance was conditional upon carrying out chores is 
associated with lower parental incomes, but higher levels of parental education, especially of the mother.  
Students from Asian families were more likely to be given financial rewards for effort put into school, but less 
likely to be given an allowance that was contingent upon fulfilling chores at home.   
Consistent with our model, these pecuniary transfers between parents and children also seem
 by child type, specifically by their IQ.  First, our results reveal that students who scored lower on t
IQ test were given higher allowances as children, a relationship significant at the 99% confidence leve
Furthermore, students with lower IQ scores were more likely to have been rewarded with money for putting 
effort into schoolwork (90% confidence), consistent with the theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2003).  Low I
students were also more likely to have been given a car by their parents, although the latter relationship is 
significant only at the 76% level.  One possible alternative explanation for this is corr
ts and children.  For example, a parent with a high IQ may have had an easier time academically, thu
expect effort in school, rather than giving rewards for it.  But it is hard to understand how low parental IQ 
should necessarily result in parents being more forthright with monetary gifts to children.  Moreover, in e
of these estimations we control for mother’s and father's education, finding that (controlling for income) 
more educated fathers offer lower allowances.   
 Our second-stage estimations in Table 5 indicate academic behavior in college is related in importa
ways to parenting behaviors, though statistical significance is weaker in most cases than in the reduced-form 
estimations in Table 2 (perhaps a reflection of weak-instrument problems previously discussed).  We include 
in the 2SLS estimations a subset of our parenting variables based on the strength of the (first-stage) 
exogenous parent and family characteristics as instruments.  In this second stage, IQ and effort are clearly 
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increase of 1.9 percentile points in GPA rank.  A 10-percentile-point increase in effort rank (based on 
percentile point estimates on a self-reported effo
GPA rank.  Being read to as a child by parents is associated with a 19.7 percentile point increase in GPA rank,
via increased academic skill.  Conversely, receiving a car as a gift is associated with a 28.3 percentile point 
decrease in effort.  The significance of parental praise, however, disappears in our second-stage estimations. 
 While in Table 5 we estimate each equation separately using two-stage least squares, the depe
variables may be sufficiently interrelated that they are subject to correlations in their respective error terms.
Thus in Table 6 we carry out our estimation using three-stage least squares, jointly estimating the equations in 
(4a) and (4b), which given cross-correlation in error terms may yield increased estimation efficiency. (W
forced to drop "overachiever" as a dependent variable in the joint estimations since its relationship to GPA 
percentile yields a singular covariance matrix among the error terms).  The 3SLS estimations indeed yield 
stronger effects of IQ and scholastic effort on student GPA, with point estimates implying that a 10-
percentile-point increase in IQ rank (effort rank) is associated with a 6.8 (13.7) percentile point increase in 
GPA rank.  Like the 2SLS and reduced-form estimates, parental reading is associated with a boost in GPA 
rank through increased academic skill (significant at the 95th percentile).  As in the 2SLS estimations, parenta
praise carries a positive sign on academic effort in our 3SLS estimations, but unlike the OLS estimations, is 
statistically insignificant. Point estimates of the other parenting variables in the jointly estimated 3SLS 
estimations parallel closely to those in the 2SLS estimations. 
 One potential source of bias that could affect all of these estimations is the issue of household 
selection into college.  A large number of studies (see for example Black and Sufi, 2002) have docume
positive relationship between college enrollment and socio-economic status (SES).  In particular, college 
enrollment is more likely among children with high levels of mother and father education and income.  The
direction of possible bias in our estimations resides in the extent to which parental behaviors are correlated 
with SES, and the extent to which SES affects self-selection into our college sample.   
To ascertain the direction of possible bias, we carried out OLS estimations of these key SES va
on our parental behavior variables (estimations not presented
 24
ing a 
ly 
 
ur 
creasing their potential, 
children
 
 
ONCLUSIONS 
 ty 
t 
 she 
applies herself to a task, such as ed arental behavior as a function of 
father's income to be significantly and positively associated with child attendance at cultural events, buy
car for a teenage child, the amount of a weekly allowance, and a father pushing a child to reach her maximum 
potential, but negatively associated with praise for the child.  Not surprisingly, mother's income is positive
associated with cultural events and the mother pushing a child to reach maximum potential.  Both mother and
father's education is strongly associated with reading to children and cultural events.  Thus it appears from o
data that high SES parents are likely to push their children into college as a means of in
 who might not have entered college otherwise.   
High SES selection into college may therefore cause us to underestimate of the effects of reading to
children on college performance, and overestimate the negative association between both high allowances and
purchasing a car for a teenager and college achievement (since college selection may be responsible for the 
association alongside its negative effect on self-esteem).  It also may bias downwards our estimate of the effect 
of parental praise on college effort since children from wealthier families appear to receive less praise, but are 
more likely to enter college.  Missing from college are less wealthy children who were praised more and would 
have performed better academically as a result, but lacked the parental drive to push them into college. 
V. SUMMARY AND C
This paper presents a model in which altruistic parents have better information about the innate abili
of their children than the children do themselves.  Because effort is complementary to the child's innate ability, 
but is also costly, parents will treat children of varying abilities differently, having an incentive to directly 
provide for children with lower innate ability, while encouraging greater effort among those of high ability.  
A parent's own characteristics also influence his behavior toward a child.  Thus a child's self-esteem is a produc
of the signals sent by parental behaviors towards her that are partly determined by her own innate giftedness 
and partly determined by the characteristics of her parents.  This in turn influences the effort with which
ucation.  Consequently, our model views p
exogenous attributes of children and parents, and the behavior of children as a function of their innate ability 
and the actions of their parents toward them in childhood. 
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hich we would argue are largely predetermined.  In this respect, we think that these findings 
add to o
Testing these hypotheses using data from a survey and IQ test of 651 university students, we find 
supporting evidence in both reduced-form and instrumental variables estimations of our model.  A summary 
of our results suggest that both parental and family characteristics, such as income, ethnic background, 
education, and family size play significant roles in the behavior of parents toward children, particularly in the 
time and effort they spend praising them for their accomplishments and reading to them, setting their 
allowance, and buying them gifts.  These behaviors also appear to be influenced by the innate ability of the 
child. Our results show that parents of students with relative
llowances and financial rewards for academic effort.   
These parental actions towards children appear to affect their work habits and performance even into 
college.  Students who were praised frequently by their parents as children exhibit a greater level of effor
college academic work, rendering them overachievers in some of our specifications.  Students who were given
large allowances and cars exhibit lower levels of effort on average, and in some specifications, also exhi
lower levels of academic achievement and underachieve relative to their potential.  Students who were 
frequently read to by their parents tend to be academic overachievers, mainly through an increase in intangible
academic skill. 
It is important to interpret our findings in light of the proxy variables we chose to represent both 
parental and child attributes and our parental behaviors.  For example, we would not contend that it is buying
a car for a child per se that causes lackadaisical effort, but rather a style of parenting, communicated by myriad 
overt and unspoken actions of the parent which may be correlated with a particular action that we measure
good deal of behavior, particularly family behavior, is endogenous to other coexisting behaviors; howev
nature of our model and data allows us to draw out these behaviors beginning from innate family 
characteristics, w
ur understanding of under- and overachievement by college students, as well as the causes and 
consequences of different approaches to parenting.  
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generally represent the significant influences in the decision-mak
coach, or even peer group.  We will use capitals when referring 
1 We will continue to refer to the latter player as the Parent, although in a more general version of the model, this player might more 
ing of the Child within her social environment, such as a teacher, 
to Child and Parent as players in our model, but lower-case letters 
when ref ing to a parent or child more generally. 
2 A more general assumption is made by Bénabou and Tirole (2000), who assume a density function ( )θf  with distribution 
err
( )θF  
that is common knowledge between the players of the game and that the Child receives a signal σ  which is indicative of θi, in the 
sense that for some σ1 > σ2 , E[θi |σ1] > E[θi |σ l densities 2], and that the ratio of the conditiona ( ) ( )LH gg θσθσ  is increasing in θi.   
5 Calculated as 100(n-rank)/n.  While the rank-percentile may artificially flatten the distribution, due to bunching of GPA’s and test 
, respectively, all significant at the 99% level of confidence. 
le 
 
using missing 
ld typically exceed 10 for two stage least squares to be reliable in a 
3 Full problem-solving test and survey available upon request. 
4 In the survey, 66.3% of the students believed that they were “a little more intelligent than their peers” while 8.8% maintained that 
they were “much more intelligent than their peers”.  However, 52.2% reported that their parents believed them to be “a little more 
intelligent than their peers” while 35.3% reported that their parents believed them to be “much more intelligent than their peers.” 
scores, the percentile of absolute scores provided a skewed distribution.  Results were virtually identical in both cases and so rank 
percentile was used for ease of interpretation. 
6 The regression estimated in calculating the Academic Skill residual is GPA = 20.02 = 0.171IQ + 0.308Effort.  T-statistics on all 
coefficients in the regression are 4.49, 4.38, and 6.04
7 Because of the large number of variables we estimate in Table 2, we drop a substantial number of observations when a sing
question remained unanswered in a survey.  We carried out a series of estimations that correct for missing observations that permit
estimation on nearly the full sample size.  We do not include these, however, since our estimations observation 
techniques do not differ significantly from those in Table 2.  
8 According to Stock et al. (2002) the first-stage F-statistic shou
regression with one endogenous variable.  The authors list first-stage F-statistic critical values for weak instrument tests for 2SLS 
with 5 to 10 instruments allowing for a maximum relative bias of 10% compared to OLS, and at the 5% significance level, as 
between 10.83 and 11.49. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
GPA Percentile 49.91 28.89 
IQ Percentile 49.92 28.88 
Level of Academic Effort 57.58 24.70 
Academic Skill 49.92 28.88 
Mother was involved (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.92 0.28 
Father was involved (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.73 0.44 
Frequency of parental praise (4 high--1 low) 2.89 0.94 
Frequency of parent reading to child (4 high--1 low) 2.78 1.08 
Frequency of going to cultural event (4 high--1 low) 2.51 0.98 
Frequency of parental criticism (4 high--1 low) 1.90 0.89 
Frequency of parents blaming other factors  
(4 = frequently—1 = infrequently) 1.51 0.80 
Parents helped student cheat (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.06 0.24 
Avg. allowance received in primary school ($) 6.13 17.80 
Allowance for completing task (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.38 0.54 
Reward for academic effort (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.21 0.41 
Parents gave car as gift (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.38 0.51 
Mother “accepted son/daughter for who s/he was”(=1)
Mother “pushed son/daughter to reach potential” (=2) 1.48 0.50 
Father “accepted son/daughter for who s/he was”(=1) 
Father “pushed son/daughter to reach potential” (=2) 1.47 0.50 
Father Annual Income 3.97 1.56 
Mother Annual Income 2.89 1.47 
Father Education ( 1 = less than high school; 2 = high 
school; 3 = college; 4 = graduate school) 2.92 0.93 
Mother Education ( 1 = less than high school; 2 = high 
school; 3 = college; 4 = graduate school) 2.75 0.87 
Average # of siblings 1.73 1.49 
Age  (years) 21.37 3.82 
Asian (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.33 0.47 
Black (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.05 0.23 
Latino (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.10 0.30 
Observations 651  
 
Note: Income brackets: 1 = Did not work/Not a part of household; 2 = < $25,000 to $50,000; 3 = $25,000 to 
$50,000; 4 = $50,000 to $100,000; 5 = $100,001 to $200,000; 6 = $200,001 to $500,000; 7 = > $500,000.
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Table 2: OLS Reduced-Form Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) = (2) - (3)
  GPA Percentile 
GPA 
Percentile 
IQ 
Percentile 
Level of 
Acad. 
Effort 
Academic 
Skill Overachiever
IQ Percentile 0.159***      
  (0.047)      
Level of Academic Effort 0.291***      
  (0.061)      
Mother was involved 1.029 0.951 -10.212* 4.826 0.657 11.848 
  (5.506) (5.666) (5.490) (4.205) (5.704) (7.427) 
Father was involved -0.618 -1.238 5.416* -5.355** -0.266 -7.245 
  (3.295) (3.379) (3.266) (2.503) (3.403) (4.429) 
Frequency of parental praise 1.117 2.048 -1.033 4.199*** 1.215 3.223 
  (1.698) (1.739) (1.698) (1.301) (1.751) (2.279) 
Freq of parents read to child 5.120*** 4.964*** -2.926* 0.248 5.543*** 7.934*** 
  (1.622) (1.668) (1.636) (1.256) (1.684) (2.186) 
Freq of cultural events 0.126 -0.434 2.876* -3.428*** -0.019 -3.286 
  (1.641) (1.678) (1.627) (1.247) (1.690) (2.199) 
Freq of parental criticism 0.480 0.538 -0.456 0.684 0.576 1.303 
  (1.734) (1.792) (1.746) (1.339) (1.806) (2.349) 
Freq of blaming other factors  0.007 -0.046 -5.565*** 2.246 0.138 5.057* 
  (1.968) (2.016) (1.983) (1.519) (2.030) (2.643) 
Parents helped student cheat -1.419 -1.943 4.999 -4.354 -1.651 -7.411 
  (5.634) (5.819) (5.800) (4.443) (5.859) (7.628) 
Allowance primary school ($) -0.132* -0.156** -0.171** 0.015 -0.137* -0.002 
  (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) (0.053) (0.071) (0.092) 
Allowance for task only 0.574 1.486 1.307 3.368 0.547 0.098 
  (2.860) (2.950) (2.858) (2.191) (2.974) (3.868) 
Reward for academic effort 0.896 0.062 -7.520** 1.999 1.266 7.764* 
  (3.329) (3.424) (3.359) (2.573) (3.448) (4.488) 
Received a car as gift  -7.443** -8.885*** 0.082 -5.063** -7.759*** -8.761** 
  (2.877) (2.962) (2.855) (2.189) (2.986) (3.883) 
Mother pushed to potential -5.064* -4.383 2.514 1.829 -4.986* -7.873** 
  (2.760) (2.848) (2.763) (2.119) (2.870) (3.733) 
Father pushed to potential -6.389** -7.092** -4.426 -0.855 -6.548** -2.326 
  (2.725) (2.806) (2.739) (2.101) (2.830) (3.678) 
Father Annual Income 1.843* 1.970* 0.129 0.410 1.913* 1.718 
  (1.002) (1.037) (1.023) (0.783) (1.044) (1.359) 
Mother Annual Income 0.263 0.155 -1.702* 0.420 0.384 1.893 
  (0.931) (0.960) (0.946) (0.725) (0.966) (1.258) 
Father Education 0.178 0.487 0.467 1.145 -0.004 -0.089 
  (1.711) (1.769) (1.744) (1.336) (1.782) (2.319) 
Mother Education 1.328 1.496 1.433 -0.196 1.467 0.901 
  (1.985) (2.054) (1.994) (1.527) (2.069) (2.693) 
Number of siblings 0.345 0.119 -2.492** 0.453 0.405 2.760** 
  (1.000) (1.027) (1.017) (0.779) (1.034) (1.346) 
Age in years -0.145 0.141 -0.123 0.877*** -0.067 0.092 
  (0.343) (0.350) (0.343) (0.264) (0.354) (0.458) 
Asian -3.179 -2.385 -1.227 2.267 -3.103 -1.076 
  (3.352) (3.461) (3.407) (2.612) (3.489) (4.537) 
Black -4.268 -7.381 -25.886*** 3.472 -4.382 18.087** 
  (6.318) (6.419) (6.397) (4.900) (6.464) (8.415) 
Latino -1.178 -1.006 -6.195 0.751 -1.171 6.357 
  (4.878) (4.983) (4.674) (3.616) (5.071) (6.531) 
Constant 2.294 23.643* 81.956*** 33.563*** 26.737** -56.444*** 
  (13.527) (13.188) (12.852) (9.873) (13.322) (17.288) 
Observations 443 444 469 468 443 444 
R-squared 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.12 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates - Student Achievements and Parental Behaviors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 GPA Percentile GPA Percentile Level of Acad. Effort Academic Skill Overachiever 
IQ Percentile 0.161***     
  (0.040)     
Level of Academic Effort 0.261***     
 (0.047)     
Freq read to child 5.659*** 5.351*** -1.655 5.917*** 5.573*** 
 (1.281) (1.326) (1.128) (1.330) (1.750) 
Freq parental praise 0.496 1.413 4.452*** 0.530 2.380 
 (1.398) (1.436) (1.215) (1.439) (1.895) 
Received a car as gift -4.386* -5.438** -4.382** -4.531* -5.016 
 (2.421) (2.503) (2.096) (2.510) (3.302) 
Allowance ($) -0.141** -0.172*** 0.011 -0.145** 0.020 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.056) (0.065) (0.086) 
Freq of cultural events 1.062 0.829 -2.085* 1.031 -1.971 
 (1.342) (1.380) (1.172) (1.386) (1.821) 
Constant 9.445* 32.002*** 56.213*** 31.742*** -15.937*** 
 (5.395) (4.354) (3.674) (4.363) (5.746) 
Observations 565 567 597 565 567 
R-squared 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: First-Stage 2SLS (Instrumental Variable) Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Freq 
parental 
praise 
Freq 
par. read 
to child 
Freq of 
cultural 
events 
Freq of 
parental 
criticism
Allowance 
in primary 
school 
Allowance 
for task 
only 
Reward 
for acad 
effort 
Received 
Car 
as gift  
Parents 
helped  
Cheat 
IQ Percentile -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002* -0.084*** 0.000 -0.001* -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Father Income 0.001 0.002 0.076*** -0.076*** 1.921*** -0.033** 0.001 0.061*** 0.001 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.548) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) 
Mother Income -0.006 -0.027 0.023 0.029 0.321 -0.025* 0.009 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.565) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) 
Father Education 0.092* 0.151*** 0.142*** -0.055 -2.702*** 0.032 0.000 0.006 0.015 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (1.036) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.013) 
Mother Education 0.107** 0.306*** 0.217*** -0.007 1.995* 0.063** 0.014 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (1.135) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.014) 
Number of Siblings -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.082*** -0.030 1.027* 0.007 -0.016 -0.020 0.001 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.536) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) 
Asian -0.489*** -0.792*** -0.350*** 0.303*** -0.394 -0.229*** 0.073* -0.110** 0.009 
 (0.085) (0.088) (0.084) (0.084) (1.790) (0.046) (0.038) (0.046) (0.023) 
Black 0.112 -0.071 0.110 0.015 -3.577 -0.131 0.104 -0.085 0.011 
 (0.176) (0.186) (0.175) (0.174) (3.760) (0.094) (0.079) (0.094) (0.047) 
Latino 0.077 -0.445*** -0.233* -0.008 -3.631 -0.117* 0.013 0.023 -0.040 
 (0.127) (0.132) (0.126) (0.125) (2.670) (0.070) (0.057) (0.068) (0.033) 
Constant 2.700*** 2.098*** 1.316*** 2.365*** 3.254 0.377*** 0.176* 0.221** 0.044 
 (0.201) (0.207) (0.198) (0.198) (4.194) (0.108) (0.090) (0.107) (0.053) 
F-statistic † 10.5 29.7 19.7 4.3 3.0 5.8 1.1 4.6 0.5 
Observations 568 569 570 571 550 553 569 567 567 
R-squared 0.13 0.30 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
† The F-statistic is the test of the joint statistical significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage model. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Second-Stage (Instrumental Variable) Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 GPA Percentile GPA Percentile 
Level of 
Acad. Effort 
Academic 
Skill Overachiever 
IQ Percentile 0.193***     
  (0.059)     
Level of Academic Effort 0.354***     
 (0.092)     
Freq read to child 19.705* 17.489* -8.092 19.297* 11.574 
 (10.600) (10.147) (8.423) (10.352) (12.090) 
Freq parental praise -18.045 -14.615 5.463 -17.958 -14.852 
 (14.732) (14.309) (10.816) (14.467) (17.048) 
Received a car as gift 23.736 17.794 -28.339* 19.992 -3.895 
 (17.348) (16.504) (15.132) (17.277) (19.663) 
Freq of cultural events -5.288 -3.500 9.657 -4.022 3.172 
 (9.730) (9.382) (8.621) (9.906) (11.178) 
Constant 21.044 44.907* 50.002*** 49.903** 2.823 
 (21.271) (23.694) (17.784) (24.158) (28.229) 
Observations 530 532 559 530 532 
Cragg-Donald Wald Stat., p-value: 0.2525 0.2251 0.1921 0.2131 0.2251 
      
Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates - Student Achievements  
and Parental Behaviors 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
GPA Percentile GPA Percentile Level of Acad. Effort Academic Skill 
IQ Percentile 0.682***    
  (0.097)    
Level of Academic Effort 1.365***    
 (0.221)    
Freq read to child 20.688 15.853* -6.036 17.477** 
 (13.280) (8.619) (7.721) (8.809) 
Freq parental praise -14.214 -10.457 3.874 -12.414 
 (19.017) (12.379) (11.089) (12.652) 
Received a car as gift 27.128 4.087 -20.962 7.554 
 (23.587) (15.115) (13.539) (15.449) 
Allowance ($) -10.526 -2.145 6.658 -3.698 
 (12.890) (8.347) (7.477) (8.531) 
Freq of cultural events -63.015* 39.135* 53.586*** 42.782** 
 (35.496) (21.119) (18.918) (21.585) 
Constant 0.682***    
 (0.097)    
Observations 514 514 514 514 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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